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Abstract 
 
This study outlines several possible structures for livestock revenue insurance. The 
policies take the form of an exotic option—an Asian basket option. The actuarially fair 
premiums for these policies are equal to the prices of the options they represent. Due to 
the complexity of pricing Asian basket options, we have combined two techniques for 
pricing options to reach the actuarially fair premiums. Projected premiums, producer 
welfare, and program efficiency are evaluated for the insurance products and existing 
market tools. Using efficiency ratios and certainty equivalent returns, we compare the 
insurance policies to strategies involving existing futures and options. 
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LIVESTOCK REVENUE INSURANCE 
In recent years, several revenue insurance products (CRC, IP, RA, GRIP, and AGR) 
have been introduced for the crop sector. These products have been well received and 
have provided an additional extension to the risk management tools available to crop 
producers. The collapse in livestock prices in the fall of 1998 has spurred interest in 
expanding this type of coverage to U.S. livestock producers. 
This paper examines several possible livestock revenue insurance products for cattle 
and hogs. The products are structured so as to minimize moral hazard problems and allow 
100 percent coverage levels. The products are exotic options that in general are difficult 
to price because there is no closed-form solution to the pricing equation. To overcome 
this difficulty a numeric procedure is developed for pricing the various exotic options 
considered. The procedure is used to calculate the cost of the options and show how the 
options might fit into the existing crop insurance program. In all cases the benefits to 
producers of the options would exceed the cost of the product itself. The fair insurance 
rates for cattle under these types of programs are much lower than for hogs. 
Results indicate that products would have affordable premium rates even at coverage 
levels of 100 percent of the revenue guarantee. An analysis of certainty equivalent returns 
and efficiency ratios is employed to compare the producer benefits under each of the 
products relative to several existing risk management strategies. 
 
Previous Revenue Insurance Work 
As early as 1983, revenue insurance was considered for agricultural products 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1983). Several articles on revenue (or portfolio) insurance 
and “assurance” have appeared in the agricultural economics literature. Turvey and 
Amanor-Boadu (1989) examined premium setting for revenue insurance for a 
representative Ontario cash crop farm. They alluded to the problem of assuming a normal 
distribution when the underlying distribution is non-normal. If, for instance, the 
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underlying distribution is positively skewed, then the normality assumption leads to 
higher premiums.  
Glauber, Harwood, and Miranda (1989) examined the effects of five disaster relief 
options on market prices, commodity program participation, producer revenue, and 
budget outlays. They found program costs would be roughly the same except for the 
target revenue program, which would cost more. The target revenue program was the best 
at stabilizing per acre farmer income and market prices. Turvey (1992a) examined price, 
crop, and revenue insurance. Using normally distributed yields, he estimated premiums 
for each type of insurance and a combined price and crop insurance for corn, soybeans, 
and wheat. He found revenue insurance premiums would be lower than the combined 
insurance premiums. Turvey also mentioned the link of futures contracts to revenue 
insurance. In another study, Turvey (1992b) compared price insurance, crop insurance, 
crop and price insurance, good-specific revenue insurance, and general revenue 
insurance. Agricultural insurance was seen to stimulate risk-neutral behavior (to produce 
higher risk crops), and premium subsidies reinforced this behavior. Turvey also 
compared dollars of public expenditure per dollars of risk reduction and found general 
revenue insurance was the best at promoting self-insurance through diversification. 
In 1994, the Iowa Farm Bill Study Team (1994), under the Iowa Plan, suggested that 
“revenue assurance” replace multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI). Under revenue 
assurance, the federal government would support farmers at a set percent of their gross 
revenue. In response to this suggestion, several papers compared various revenue insurance 
plans to the current farm policy situation. Gray, Richardson, and McClasky (1994) found 
the revenue insurance alternatives to be less expensive and more effective at supporting 
farm income than the current farm policy. Harwood et al. (1994) found similar results. 
Stokes, Nayda, and English (1997) applied a theoretical model to value the Iowa Plan. 
Their results indicated that a whole-farm based gross revenue assurance plan is generally 
less costly than a weighted average of individual-crop plans. Babcock and Hennessy (1996) 
examined the issue of moral hazard with revenue insurance. They concluded that if 
coverage levels are kept below 80 percent, then farmers' input decisions are not greatly 
affected. Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes (1997) studied the budgetary and producer 
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welfare effects of revenue insurance. Their findings suggested that a revenue insurance 
program would provide greater benefits at lower costs than the 1990 farm program. 
 
Livestock Risks 
The first issue that must be addressed with livestock insurance is what should be 
covered: production risk, price risk, or both. For most livestock producers, production 
risk is relatively small when compared to price risk. Relative to crop production, 
livestock production risk is much smaller because livestock are more adaptable to 
weather variations, and many livestock production facilities protect the animals from 
stress caused by adverse weather conditions. Most production risk can be attributed to 
disease, mechanical failure, or variability in weight gain. 
Livestock producers face both output and input price risk, with feed being the most 
variable input price. The high corn and soybean prices in the fall of 1995 and spring of 
1996 led to larger production costs than most livestock producers had anticipated. 
Therefore, the insurance products examined here can take both of these risks into account. 
Currently, livestock producers can purchase futures and options on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange to form a position that would serve like price insurance. However, 
livestock revenue insurance may be more attractive for several reasons. More livestock 
producers might use a revenue insurance product than currently use the futures and 
options markets. The insurance product can be tailored to the individual producer's needs. 
The need for specialized knowledge about the futures and options markets would be 
transferred from the producer to the insurance company, so that the insurance contract 
would be similar to crop insurance contracts, which many of the producers have entered. 
 
Contract Details 
Three possible insurance policies are examined. The first insurance product is 
constructed to guarantee net revenue, i.e., output revenue less feed costs. The form of the 
product is an Asian (or average) basket put option. An Asian option is an option that pays 
off at maturity the difference (if positive) between the average of prices over a given time 
and a set strike price. A basket option is an option that pays off at maturity the difference 
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(if positive) between the value of a portfolio of assets and a set strike value. An Asian 
basket option is a combination of the two: the payout at maturity is the difference (if 
positive) between the average value of a portfolio of assets and a set strike value. 
The revenue insurance contract is set up as an annual contract. The contract would 
run from April to March. This time frame was chosen to align livestock insurance signup 
with crop insurance signup for corn and soybeans. In most cases, federally subsidized 
agricultural insurance for spring-planted crops has a sales closing date of March 15. The 
only information producers would be required to provide at signup is the number of 
animals that they intend to market in each calendar month. The policies assume a given 
production plan and are based on estimated livestock returns series from Iowa State 
University Extension. Livestock prices are based on the futures prices on the nearby 
contract (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, lean hog and live cattle contracts) from the 
month the animal is marketed. Feed costs are based on lagged futures prices for corn and 
soybean meal (Chicago Board of Trade). The timing of the prices and contracts is 
detailed in Tables 1 and 2. Due to the length of the insurance contract, indemnities would 
not be known until the following spring (unless the marketing plan does not include any 
marketings during the latter half of the contract). 
The insurance policies minimize the moral hazard problem since the producer cannot 
affect the likelihood of a payment. Under the policy framework, producers provide 
expected per-month marketing figures at signup and actual per-month marketing figures 
at termination (verified by receipts). Animals are assumed to be marketed at set weights; 
feed rations are determined by the specified production plan. Prices are set by the futures 
markets. Thus, individual producers do not have the ability to change the probability of 
indemnification. Following the crop insurance example, premiums could be collected at 
termination. Then if actual marketings differ from expected marketings, premiums can be 
adjusted to reflect the changes. 
The revenue insurance contracts do not have to be as rigidly structured as described 
above. This is done to provide a well-defined example of the policy. However, the policy 
can be tailored to the producer's needs, and the policy design can accommodate varying 
lengths of coverage and starting dates. 
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For the hog insurance policy, a farrow-to-finish operation serves as the target 
producer. The hogs are assumed to be marketed at 250 pounds. The lean hog futures price 
is converted to a live weight basis by multiplying by a factor of 0.74. Feed costs are 
based on 13.22 bushels of corn and 188.52 pounds of soybean meal and are calculated on 
the three-month lagged futures prices for corn and soybean meal. The three-month lag 
was chosen to align the price with the median point in the feed cycle for farrow-to-finish 
hogs; i.e., approximately half of the feed needed to bring the hog to market weight is fed 
before this time. The calculated revenue from marketing one hog in month t is given by 
250*0.74*LeanHogt - 13.22*Cornt-3 - (188.52/2000)*SoyMealt-3      (1) 
where LeanHog is the average price of the relevant lean hog futures contract, Corn is the 
average price of the relevant corn futures contract, and SoyMeal is the average price of 
the relevant soybean meal futures contract. Table 1 details the contracts used and the 
periods over which the price averages are formed for the hog policy. 
For the cattle insurance policy, a finishing operation for steer calves is the target 
producer. The cattle are assumed to be marketed at 1,150 pounds. Feeder calves weigh in 
at 550 pounds and take eight months to reach market weight. Feed costs are based on 
48.2 bushels of corn and are calculated on the four-month lagged corn futures price. 
Again the lag was chosen to divide the feed cycle in half by the number of corn bushels. 
The calculated revenue from marketing one animal in month t is given by 
1150*LiveCattlet - 48.2*Cornt-4      (2) 
where LiveCattle is the average price of the relevant live cattle futures contract, and Corn 
is the average price of the relevant corn futures contract. Table 2 specifies the futures 
contracts and the price averages used in the cattle policy. 
The product has the standard payout stream of the form 
max[0, revenue guarantee - marketing revenue]     (3) 
where the revenue guarantee is based on prices at the time of the contract signing and the 
marketing revenue represents the revenue calculated for indemnification purposes. Both 
the revenue guarantee and the marketing revenue are based on futures prices. The 
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revenue guarantee is calculated from the coverage level and projected prices formed from 
the average futures prices for the various livestock and crop futures over the first five 
trading days in March and follows the price structures outlined above. Prices for non-
contract months are formed by linear interpolation between the previous and nearby 
futures contracts for that month. For example, the projected corn price for June is the 
average of the projected corn prices for May and July. If prices are not established for the 
needed contracts (this might be the case for the lean hog and live cattle futures for April 
of the next year), the prices are taken to be equal to the latest price available (for 
example, the projected price for February also ma y be employed as the projection for 
April). For the first few months of the contract, feed costs are predetermined because the 
lagged prices have already been observed. 
Marketing revenue is based on the actual average futures settlement prices and 
again follows the price structure outlined above. For contract months, the average price 
is taken from the settlement prices of the first ten trading days of the month. For non-
contract months, the average price is taken from the settlement prices on the nearby 
contract over the entire month. For example, the October corn price is the average 
futures settlement price for corn on the December contract over the entire month of 
October. We examine two variations on this policy. The first variation calculates 
indemnities on a monthly basis and sums them for the annual indemnity payment. The 
second variation removes the feed component. 
 
Premium Determination 
The actuarially fair premium for the net revenue insurance policy is the price of the 
Asian basket option that the policy mimics. Pricing this option is not an easy task. The 
arithmetic Asian option is based on the sum of prices. The sum of lognormal variables is 
not lognormal and has no closed-form probability density function. Thus, the pricing of 
an arithmetic Asian option is quite difficult. Several techniques have been developed to 
price arithmetic Asian options. These include a partial differential equation approach 
(Alziary, Décamps, and Koehl [1997]; Zvan, Forsyth, and Vetzal [1998]) and binomial 
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lattices (Hull and White [1993]) among others. Milevsky and Posner (1998) provide a 
more complete listing of possible techniques with related articles. 
Given the complexity of the Asian basket option, two of the techniques for pricing 
arithmetic Asian options are combined in this study. First, an analytic approximation to 
produce closed-form probability density functions for the price averages of the futures 
prices is employed to cover the Asian part of the option. Next, Monte Carlo simulations 
based on these closed-form probability density functions are used to fully analyze the 
Asian basket option. Two different analytic approximations, lognormal and inverse 
gamma, are specified for the average price distributions. The probability density function 
for an inverse gamma random variable, q, is given by 
p(q) = (b-a/G(a))q-(a+1)exp(-1/bq)       (4) 
where p(.) represents the probability density function, a is a shape parameter, b is a scale 
parameter, and G(.) is the gamma function. Several studies have supported the use of a 
lognormal distribution as a good approximation for the distribution of a price average 
(see, for example, Turnbull and Wakeman [1991] or Levy [1992]). However, as 
volatilities rise, the lognormal approximation fares less well (Levy, 1997). Milevsky and 
Posner (1998) found that under certain conditions the infinite sum of correlated 
lognormal random variables has an inverse gamma distribution. Thus, another natural 
approximation for the distribution of a finite sum of correlated lognormal random 
variables is an inverse gamma distribution. 
Two different runs are performed. In the first run, the lognormal approximation is 
employed. In the second run, the inverse gamma approximation is applied. The rank 
correlations among the feed and livestock prices are set at historical levels for both runs. 
Tables 3 and 4 display the rank correlations. In each of the runs, the efficient market 
hypothesis is assumed to hold, implying that the projected prices represent the means for 
the actual prices. Also, volatilities are obtained from at-the-money options. All prices and 
volatilities are the actual projected prices and volatilities for the 1999 contract year. 
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Since the volatilities are given for a specific day, adjustments must be made to reach 
realistic volatilities for the price averages. For any random variables X1, … Xn, let Y = 
(1/n) å =n 1i iX . Then 
Var(Y) = (1/n)2 ( )å =n 1i iXVar  + 2(1/n)2 å å r= >n 1i ij jiji, )Var(X)Var(X     (5) 
where ri,j is the correlation between Xi and Xj. If we approximate (1/n) ( )å =n 1i iXVar  and 
)Var(X)Var(X ji  with Var(Xn/2), then 
Var(Y) = (1/n)Var(Xn/2) + 2(1/n)2Var(Xn/2) å å r= >n 1i ij ji, .    (6) 
If the correlations only depend on the difference, j - i, then 
Var(Y) = (1/n)Var(Xn/2) + 2(1/n)2Var(Xn/2) å r= +1-n 1i 1i-n1,i .    (7) 
The correlations of the ratios of the daily settlement prices for the first ten trading days 
(nine days for lean hogs) from the contract month to the average settlement price for the 
first five days in March for the same contract for corn, soybean meal, lean hog, and live 
cattle futures since 1960 are examined. These are shown in Table 5. Based on these 
correlations, the following structure for the variance of the price averages is assumed: 
Var(Pa) = (1/n)Var(Pn/2) + 2(1/n)2Var(Pn/2) å =1-n 1i j))-0.005(n-i(1     (8) 
where Pa represents the price average, n is the number of days the average is taken over, 
and Pn/2 represents the price from the middle of the time period. For these calculations, it 
is assumed that there are 22 trading days (n = 22) for noncontract months and 10 trading 
days (n = 10) for contract months. 
Assuming equal marketings in each month, projected revenues for the 1999 contract 
year are $58.05 and $656.26 per head for hogs and cattle, respectively. Each run consists 
of 10,000 simulations of the price processes for average corn, soybean meal, lean hog, 
and live cattle futures settlement prices for the relevant months and are performed with 
the @RISK add-on to Microsoft Excel (Palisade Corp., 1996). From these, the option 
payouts are calculated. The average of the option payouts is the estimate of the price of 
the option and the actuarially fair premium for the insurance policy. These simulations 
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could be looked at as years and the analysis consists of calculating the average loss under 
each insurance policy for 10,000 years. 
In all cases presented here, the premiums are based on the producer marketing an equal 
number of animals each month throughout the year. Different marketing plans would result 
in different premium rates and per head premiums. Due to the structure of the policies, 
however, there are no size effects on the per head premiums. Whether the producer markets 
one animal per month or 1,000, if the marketing plans have the same proportional makeup 
per month, the per head premiums will be the same. Also, the premium rates are not 
impacted by the geographic location or the production facilities of the farm.  
Table 6 shows the per head premiums for hogs and cattle at the 85 percent coverage 
level or higher under the two runs. Per head premiums are equal to the product of the 
premium rate, the coverage level, and the per head projected revenue. The premium 
estimates between the two runs are similar. The premium rates and per head premiums 
from the lognormal run are larger than those from the inverse gamma run, but the 
difference does not change greatly with the coverage level. Similar patterns emerge for 
lower coverage levels for hogs. The volatilities embodied by the Asian basket option for 
cattle are significantly lower than for hogs. Thus, the premium rates for cattle are much 
lower. But since the liability per head is higher with cattle, the per head premiums for 
cattle are higher than for hogs at the higher coverage levels. 
 
Projected Premiums, Producer Welfare, and Efficiency 
Given the structure of the insurance policies, it is possible to examine possible 
premiums and producer welfare with the livestock revenue insurance programs. The 
premiums estimated from the lognormal distributions are used for this analysis. Since 
these estimates are larger than those from the inverse gamma run, they will imply smaller 
benefits to producers from the insurance coverage. It is assumed that producers pay the 
actuarially fair premiums for the insurance policies. To examine the effects of the 
insurance policies on producer welfare, certainty equivalent returns (CERs) with and 
without the policies in place are computed. 
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To calculate CERs, risk preferences are assumed to be constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) in form and three levels of risk aversion are chosen. The form of the 
CARA utility function employed is  
U(Y(R)) = 1 - exp(-lY(R))      (9) 
where Y is the producer's income, R is the producer's revenue, and l is the risk aversion 
coefficient. The producer's expected utility over the revenue distribution, 
( )( )( ) ( ) [ ]ò =l--
¥
0
UERRpRYexp1 d      (10) 
where p(R) represents the probability density function for revenue, is required to 
calculate the CER. The definition of the CER is that it is the certain income that 
generated the same utility as the risky endeavor. Thus, 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )ò l--=l--
¥
0
CERexp1RRpRYexp1 d     (11) 
which implies that 
CER = -(ln(1 - E[U]))/l .      (12) 
Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993) outline the choice of risk aversion coefficients 
based on the variability of revenues. For hogs, a marketing plan of 125 animals per 
month for the entire year (1,500 hogs, the average Iowa farm's output of hogs) is put in 
place. Expected revenues are equal to $87,050.91 with the standard deviation of revenue 
equal to $20,797.61. For cattle, a marketing plan of six animals per month for the entire 
year (72 head, the average Iowa farm's output of cattle) is used. Expected revenues are 
equal to $47,251.62 with the standard deviation of revenue equal to $3,265.63. Risk 
aversion coefficients are set to achieve risk premiums of 10, 25, and 50 percent of the 
standard deviation of revenue. This range of risk premiums is chosen to cover several 
levels of risk aversion. 
To calculate the efficiency of the insurance program, the ratio of the increase in 
producer welfare per dollar of premium is examined. The increase in producer welfare is 
measured by the change in the CER between the insurance and no insurance figures. An 
efficiency ratio above one indicates the producer's welfare increases by more than one 
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dollar for each dollar the producer spends on the program. For comparison purposes, a 
lump sum cash transfer would produce an efficiency ratio of one. 
The premiums, CERs, and efficiencies for revenue insurance are presented in Table 7. 
Expected premiums for the hog revenue insurance range from $12.60 (less than $0.01 per 
head) for 70 percent coverage for the no feed alternative to over $9,000 ($6.32 per head) 
for 100 percent coverage for the monthly alternative. The risk premium for the producer is 
set at 25 percent. The CER of no action is $82,003.11 for hogs and $46,431.73 for cattle. 
The addition of revenue insurance to the livestock producer's set of risk management tools 
raises the CER. CER increases range from $37.18 to $2,691.89 for the no feed and monthly 
alternatives, respectively, with the addition of 70 percent revenue insurance coverage. 
Efficiencies vary from 1.35 for the 100 percent monthly alternative coverage to 2.95 for the 
70 percent no feed alternative coverage. These efficiencies indicate that hog producers 
would receive at least $1.35 worth of benefits for each dollar of premium spent. 
For the cattle revenue insurance plans, premiums range from $50.98 ($0.71 per head) 
for 90 percent coverage for the no feed alternative to $1,630.88 ($22.65 per head) for 100 
percent coverage for the monthly alternative. Marketing revenues from cattle computed 
under the various insurance policy structures are much less variable than the marketing 
revenues from hogs. The CERs for the medium-risk-aversion producer increase, on 
average, by $266.23 for 90 percent coverage and $1,982.23 for 100 percent coverage over 
the no insurance CER. Efficiencies for cattle revenue insurance are all above 1.30, with the 
lower coverage levels having efficiencies at or above three. As Hennessy, Babcock, and 
Hayes (1997) found in their study, this study also finds that efficiencies decline as the 
coverage level rises. 
At each coverage level for both hogs and cattle, the monthly alternative maximizes 
CER, followed by the net revenue policy and the no feed alternative, respectively. The 
order of these policies is reversed when efficiencies are examined, except at the 100 
percent coverage level where the net revenue policy is ranked first. Figures for the low- and 
high-risk-aversion producers are available from the authors by request. The same patterns 
appear with these producers. As would be expected, CERs decrease and efficiencies 
increase as the risk aversion coefficient rises. 
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To examine whether these products might be viable, premium rates, CERs, and 
efficiencies for comparable risk management strategies using existing futures and 
options also are examined. The futures and options strategies are structured to somewhat 
mimic the insurance policies. The timing and number of contracts of the transactions are 
set given the marketing plans of the farms specified above. For example, the hog farm 
studied markets 125 hogs each month. Given the lean hog contract size of 40,000 
pounds, each farm's monthly production is just under 58 percent of what is required for a 
futures or options contract. Thus, it is assumed that the producer sells (shorts) one hog 
future for each of the contract months (April, June, July, August, October, December, 
and February) over the insurance period. For cattle, since each farm’s monthly 
production is less than 18 percent of what is required for a futures or options contract, 
the producer uses fewer contracts to hedge production. It is specified that the producer 
sells (shorts) one cattle future for the August and February contracts. The option 
positions follow the futures positions taken; thus, put options are used in place of 
shorting futures and call options are used in place of being long on futures. A transact 
and hold strategy also is assumed. The producer establishes the futures and options 
positions in March and holds the positions until they mature. 
The assumed futures positions for cattle are that producers short one August and 
February live cattle future and long one December corn future. Hog producers short one 
April, June, July, August, October, December, and February lean hog future and long one 
May, July, September, and December corn future and one December soybean meal future. 
The futures and options positions have the disadvantage of the producer having to combine 
several months of production or feed coverage to one contract, i.e., the producer cannot 
customize the contracts to their production plan as accurately as the insurance products 
allow. Transaction costs are not taken into account for this analysis, so the futures positions 
face no associated costs and the options positions cost only the fair value of the option. For 
simplicity, the options cost is referred to as a premium. The strategies All Options and All 
Futures imply that the producer has taken positions in both the livestock and feed markets. 
The strategies Livestock Options and Livestock Futures imply that the producer has taken 
positions in only the livestock markets. 
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Table 8 displays the certainty equivalent returns and efficiencies for the seven risk 
management strategies. For comparison purposes, the insurance coverage is set at 100 
percent. For hog producers, the rankings of the strategies remain the same as the risk 
premium is changed. The strategy that maximizes CER less premium is the livestock and 
feed futures strategy. This is followed by just livestock futures, the monthly alternative of 
the net revenue policy, the net revenue policy, livestock and feed options, the no feed 
alternative, and just livestock options. The strategy that provides the largest efficiency is 
the net revenue policy, followed by the no feed and monthly alternatives and the options 
positions. The futures strategies have no efficiency measures since they face no costs. 
The efficiency rankings of the strategies for cattle producers are the same as they were 
for hog producers. However, the rankings in regard to CER less premium do vary as the 
risk premium changes. In all cases, the livestock futures strategy is ranked the highest and 
the trio of the no feed alternative for the net revenue policy, livestock and feed options, and 
livestock and feed futures are the lowest-ranked strategies. For the less-risk-averse 
producer (risk premium equals ten percent), livestock options have a higher CER less 
premium than the monthly alternative and the net revenue policy. For the medium-risk-
averse producer (risk premium equals 25 percent), the monthly alternative has the higher 
CER less premium, followed by livestock options and the net revenue policy. For the more-
risk-averse producer (risk premium equals 50 percent), the order of the livestock options 
and net revenue policy is switched. 
All of the strategies raise the producer's CER. For the low-risk-aversion producers, any 
of the strategies increase CERs by at least $1,156.97 and $118.98 for hogs and cattle, 
respectively. The high-risk-aversion producers increase their CERs by $6,721.31 for hogs 
and $449.80 for cattle by following one of these strategies. The insurance products have 
efficiency ratios of at least 1.13, implying that for each dollar of premium, the producer 
receives at least $1.13 in benefits. For the high-risk-aversion producers, insurance 
efficiency ratios approach two. Also, the insurance policies are always ranked higher than 
the options positions in terms of efficiency. 
To examine the impact of the contract sizes and months on the results above, CERs 
and efficiencies are calculated under the assumption that futures and options contracts 
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can be tailored to the livestock producer's needs. For example, the hog producer is 
assumed to sell (short) one theoretical hog future (with a contract size of 23,125 
pounds) each month of the year (i.e., all months are contract months). Table 9 contains 
the results with the theoretical fractional contracts. For the hog producer, the CERs and 
efficiencies are very similar to those shown earlier. For the cattle producer, the 
efficiency rankings remain the same, although the options strategies do increase in 
efficiency. The CER rankings, however, change quite dramatically. The All Futures 
strategy moves from last to first. It is followed by the Livestock Futures strategy and 
the monthly alternative for the insurance policy. The no feed alternative ranks last. 
These changes are not unexpected though, since the contract size and month constraints 
for the cattle example are sizable. Instead of the cattle producer trading two 40,000 
pound live cattle contracts and one 5,000 bushel corn contract, they trade twelve 6,900 
pound live cattle contracts and twelve 289 bushel corn contracts. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions of revenues under various risk management 
strategies listed in Table 8. Only the distributions for some of the strategies are shown in 
the figures. All omitted strategies have distributions that fall between the extremes shown. 
All insurance packages are examined at the 100 percent coverage level. Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of hog revenues. If the producer chooses to follow none of the strategies, the 
revenue distribution is fairly symmetrical about the mean revenue of $87,051, with a range 
between $25,239 and $183,546. The use of livestock and feed futures also creates a 
symmetric revenue distribution, but the revenue spread is much less ($73,242 to $105,325). 
The futures strategy moves weight from the tails of the distribution to the middle, limiting 
both upside and downside risk almost equally. The insurance products and the options 
positions create asymmetric revenue distributions. More downside risk is removed than 
upside risk. The upper bound for the three insurance or options alternatives in the figure is 
around $175,000. The lower bound for the net revenue policy is $78,839. For the no feed 
alternative, the lower bound of revenue is $51,636. Livestock and feed options provide a 
revenue lower bound of $69,033. 
Figure 2 contains the distributions of cattle revenues under various risk management 
strategies. Again, given the producer follows none of the strategies, the revenue distribution 
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is fairly symmetric around the mean value of $47,252. Futures positions keep the symmetry 
of the revenue distribution, but reduce the variability. The addition of live cattle futures to 
the producer's portfolio shrinks the revenue spread from $24,349 to $12,043, a reduction of 
one-half. For cattle producers, the addition of corn futures, on top of live cattle futures, to 
the portfolio actually increases revenue variability as the revenue spread rises back to 
$23,702, nearly the same size as the original spread. The insurance products and options 
positions embody asymmetric revenue distributions. These alternatives provide a higher 
revenue “floor” for the producer for a slightly lower “most likely” revenue. 
Holthausen (1981) outlined a risk and return analysis that examines the relative 
benefits of each risk management strategy. Risk is associated with deviations below a target 
revenue. Return is associated with deviations above a target revenue. The target revenue is 
set at the expected revenue of the livestock operation. The insurance products and the 
options strategies are ranked higher, in terms of a risk/return ratio, since they reduce risk 
more than they reduce return. The futures strategies reduce return more than risk. These 
effects can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This study outlines several possible structures for livestock revenue insurance. The 
basic policy takes the form of an exotic option, an Asian basket option. Two alternative 
products are constructed by adding monthly evaluations and by removing the feed 
component. The actuarially fair premiums for these policies are equal to the prices of the 
options they represent. Due to the complexity of pricing Asian basket options, two 
techniques for pricing options are combined to reach the actuarially fair premiums. Two 
different assumption sets are used to calculate premiums and both produce similar results. 
Projected premiums, producer welfare, and program efficiency are evaluated for the 
insurance products and existing market tools. The efficiency ratios for the products indicate 
that livestock producers would benefit from such insurance packages and that these 
insurance products provide more dollar-for-dollar benefits than existing options. 
Comparisons of certainty equivalent returns indicate that the insurance policies are 
competitive with existing options but can be ranked behind strategies with existing futures.
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TABLE 1. Hog net revenue price structure  
Marketing 
Month 
Lean Hog 
Average 
Monthly 
Price* 
Lean Hog 
Contract** 
Feed 
Average 
Monthly 
Price* 
Corn 
Contract** 
Soybean 
Meal 
Contract** 
April April April January March January 
May May June February March March 
June June June March March March 
July July July April May May 
August August August May May May 
September September October June July July 
October October October July July July 
November November December August September August 
December December December September September September 
January January February October December October 
February February February November December December 
March March April December December December 
*For contract months, the average price is taken from the settlement prices of the first ten 
trading days of the month. For noncontract months, the average price is taken from the 
settlement prices on the nearby contract over the entire month. 
**The lean hog contracts are on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the corn and 
soybean meal contracts are on the Chicago Board of Trade. 
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TABLE 2. Cattle net revenue price structure 
 
Marketing 
Month 
Live Cattle 
Average Monthly 
Price* 
 
Live Cattle 
Contract** 
 
Corn Average 
Monthly Price* 
 
Corn 
Contract** 
April April April December December 
May May June January March 
June June June February March 
July July August March March 
August August August April May 
September September October May May 
October October October June July 
November November December July July 
December December December August September 
January January February September September 
February February February October December 
March March April November December 
*For contract months, the average price is taken from the settlement prices of the first ten 
trading days of the month. For noncontract months, the average price is taken from the 
settlement prices on the nearby contract over the entire month. 
**The live cattle contracts are on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the corn 
contracts are on the Chicago Board of Trade. 
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TABLE 3. Rank correlations for the Hog Insurance Analysis 
 Corn 
-Mar 
Corn 
-Apr 
Corn 
-May 
Corn 
-June 
Corn 
-July 
Corn 
-Aug 
Corn 
-Sept 
Corn 
-Oct 
Corn 
-Nov 
Corn 
-Dec 
Corn-Mar 1.00          
Corn-Apr 0.25 1.00         
Corn-May 0.31 0.86 1.00        
Corn-June 0.07 0.67 0.78 1.00       
Corn-July -0.09 0.60 0.69 0.92 1.00      
Corn-Aug -0.23 0.47 0.49 0.72 0.87 1.00     
Corn-Sept -0.20 0.40 0.46 0.71 0.85 0.97 1.00    
Corn-Oct -0.06 0.37 0.42 0.61 0.70 0.89 0.88 1.00   
Corn-Nov 0.00 0.40 0.41 0.52 0.62 0.82 0.81 0.95 1.00  
Corn-Dec -0.09 0.38 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.82 0.81 0.94 0.98 1.00 
SoyM-Mar 0.23 0.20 0.14 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
SoyM-Apr 0.03 0.48 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.18 
SoyM-May -0.03 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.30 0.21 0.24 
SoyM-June -0.09 0.16 0.21 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.44 0.51 
SoyM-July -0.22 0.23 0.36 0.60 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.66 0.53 0.59 
SoyM-Aug -0.23 0.25 0.31 0.52 0.61 0.81 0.76 0.74 0.61 0.66 
SoyM-Sept -0.14 0.22 0.35 0.54 0.58 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.63 0.67 
SoyM-Oct -0.06 0.36 0.50 0.68 0.68 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.69 0.72 
SoyM-Nov -0.05 0.31 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.76 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.76 
SoyM-Dec 0.00 0.34 0.50 0.64 0.65 0.76 0.72 0.79 0.70 0.75 
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TABLE 3. Rank correlations for the Hog Insurance Analysis (continued) 
 SoyM 
-Mar 
SoyM 
-Apr 
SoyM 
-May 
SoyM 
-June 
SoyM 
-July 
SoyM 
-Aug 
SoyM 
-Sept 
SoyM 
-Oct 
SoyM 
-Nov 
SoyM 
-Dec 
SoyM-Mar 1.00          
SoyM-Apr 0.53 1.00         
SoyM-May 0.39 0.82 1.00        
SoyM-June 0.21 0.51 0.71 1.00       
SoyM-July 0.08 0.31 0.55 0.84 1.00      
SoyM-Aug -0.06 0.35 0.53 0.74 0.86 1.00     
SoyM-Sept -0.06 0.27 0.50 0.70 0.81 0.95 1.00    
SoyM-Oct -0.04 0.30 0.46 0.68 0.81 0.91 0.95 1.00   
SoyM-Nov -0.08 0.31 0.50 0.69 0.80 0.91 0.94 0.96 1.00  
SoyM-Dec 0.01 0.33 0.52 0.76 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.97 1.00 
LHog-Apr 0.09 0.30 0.51 0.25 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 
LHog-May 0.14 0.40 0.57 0.17 0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 
LHog-June 0.14 0.37 0.59 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.09 
LHog-July 0.17 0.36 0.54 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.13 
LHog-Aug 0.08 0.37 0.56 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.29 
LHog-Sept 0.01 0.37 0.44 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.32 0.32 
LHog-Oct 0.07 0.33 0.42 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.30 
LHog-Nov -0.06 0.20 0.25 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.18 
LHog-Dec -0.02 0.23 0.23 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.18 
LHog-JanN 0.10 0.49 0.43 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.24 0.26 0.26 
LHog-FebN 0.15 0.54 0.51 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.26 0.28 
LHog-MarN 0.25 0.49 0.43 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.20 
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TABLE 3. Rank correlations for the Hog Insurance Analysis (continued) 
 LHog 
-Apr 
LHog 
-May 
LHog 
-June 
LHog 
-July 
LHog 
-Aug 
LHog 
-Sept 
LHog 
-Oct 
LHog 
-Nov 
LHog 
-Dec 
LHog 
-JanN 
LHog 
-FebN 
LHog 
-MarN 
LHog-Apr 1.00            
LHog-May 0.89 1.00           
LHog-June 0.86 0.95 1.00          
LHog-July 0.74 0.79 0.81 1.00         
LHog-Aug 0.58 0.70 0.71 0.91 1.00        
LHog-Sept 0.40 0.52 0.54 0.78 0.90 1.00       
LHog-Oct 0.39 0.55 0.56 0.71 0.85 0.92 1.00      
LHog-Nov 0.30 0.46 0.45 0.63 0.79 0.85 0.93 1.00     
LHog-Dec 0.30 0.47 0.45 0.61 0.72 0.76 0.86 0.94 1.00    
LHog-JanN 0.39 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.91 1.00   
LHog-FebN 0.52 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.96 1.00  
LHog-MarN 0.36 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.81 0.90 0.92 1.00 
Corn-Mar 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.27 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.28 
Corn-Apr 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.23 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.29 
Corn-May 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.41 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.38 
Corn-June 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.37 0.37 0.24 
Corn-July 0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.21 0.11 
Corn-Aug -0.18 -0.33 -0.29 -0.23 -0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.02 
Corn-Sept -0.14 -0.34 -0.32 -0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.03 
Corn-Oct -0.26 -0.37 -0.28 -0.22 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.04 
Corn-Nov -0.29 -0.39 -0.34 -0.24 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.11 0.08 
Corn-Dec -0.33 -0.43 -0.37 -0.29 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.05 
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TABLE 4. Rank correlations for the Cattle Insurance Analysis 
 Corn 
-Mar 
Corn 
-Apr 
Corn 
-May 
Corn 
-June 
Corn 
-July 
Corn 
-Aug 
Corn 
-Sept 
Corn 
-Oct 
Corn 
-Nov 
Corn 
-Dec 
Corn-Mar 1.00          
Corn-Apr 0.25 1.00         
Corn-May 0.31 0.86 1.00        
Corn-June 0.07 0.67 0.78 1.00       
Corn-July -0.09 0.60 0.69 0.92 1.00      
Corn-Aug -0.23 0.47 0.49 0.72 0.87 1.00     
Corn-Sept -0.20 0.40 0.46 0.71 0.85 0.97 1.00    
Corn-Oct -0.06 0.37 0.42 0.61 0.70 0.89 0.88 1.00   
Corn-Nov 0.00 0.40 0.41 0.52 0.62 0.82 0.81 0.95 1.00  
Corn-Dec -0.09 0.38 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.82 0.81 0.94 0.98 1.00 
LCat-Apr -0.04 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 
LCat-May 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 
LCat-June -0.02 0.46 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.14 
LCat-July 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
LCat-Aug 0.16 0.36 0.38 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
LCat-Sept 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.10 
LCat-Oct 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.29 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.12 
LCat-Nov 0.38 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.41 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.22 
LCat-Dec 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.52 0.36 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.18 
LCat-JanN 0.14 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.15 
LCat-FebN 0.17 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
LCat-MarN 0.17 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
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TABLE 4. Rank correlations for the Cattle Insurance Analysis (continued) 
 LCat 
-Apr 
LCat 
-May 
LCat 
-June 
LCat 
-July 
LCat 
-Aug 
LCat 
-Sept 
LCat 
-Oct 
LCat 
-Nov 
LCat 
-Dec 
LCat 
-JanN 
LCat 
-FebN 
LCat 
-MarN 
LCat-Apr 1.00            
LCat-May 0.85 1.00           
LCat-June 0.79 0.85 1.00          
LCat-July 0.11 0.28 0.52 1.00         
LCat-Aug 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.90 1.00        
LCat-Sept 0.08 0.15 0.45 0.78 0.83 1.00       
LCat-Oct 0.17 0.23 0.44 0.72 0.74 0.87 1.00      
LCat-Nov 0.07 0.05 0.33 0.52 0.66 0.80 0.87 1.00     
LCat-Dec 0.15 0.08 0.31 0.52 0.63 0.71 0.85 0.95 1.00    
LCat-JanN 0.25 0.08 0.35 0.51 0.71 0.69 0.80 0.82 0.86 1.00   
LCat-FebN 0.35 0.21 0.38 0.43 0.61 0.62 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.95 1.00  
LCat-MarN 0.45 0.40 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.81 0.69 0.74 0.87 0.94 1.00 
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TABLE 5. Price ratio correlations from the first ten trading days of the contract 
month 
Corn  
 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10 
Day1 1.000          
Day2 0.997 1.000         
Day3 0.995 0.997 1.000        
Day4 0.992 0.992 0.997 1.000       
Day5 0.990 0.990 0.994 0.998 1.000      
Day6 0.983 0.983 0.988 0.993 0.997 1.000     
Day7 0.983 0.985 0.988 0.992 0.995 0.997 1.000    
Day8 0.984 0.986 0.989 0.990 0.992 0.991 0.996 1.000   
Day9 0.982 0.984 0.986 0.986 0.988 0.988 0.993 0.997 1.000  
Day10 0.976 0.978 0.980 0.980 0.982 0.984 0.988 0.993 0.997 1.000 
Live Cattle  
 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10 
Day1 1.000          
Day2 0.996 1.000         
Day3 0.990 0.995 1.000        
Day4 0.985 0.991 0.996 1.000       
Day5 0.977 0.983 0.990 0.995 1.000      
Day6 0.973 0.977 0.983 0.989 0.995 1.000     
Day7 0.965 0.970 0.977 0.983 0.990 0.995 1.000    
Day8 0.959 0.964 0.970 0.976 0.984 0.990 0.996 1.000   
Day9 0.953 0.958 0.963 0.969 0.978 0.985 0.992 0.997 1.000  
Day10 0.949 0.953 0.958 0.963 0.973 0.981 0.988 0.991 0.996 1.000 
Lean Hog  
 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 
Day1 1.000         
Day2 0.997 1.000        
Day3 0.993 0.997 1.000       
Day4 0.992 0.994 0.997 1.000      
Day5 0.989 0.991 0.994 0.997 1.000     
Day6 0.984 0.988 0.990 0.993 0.997 1.000    
Day7 0.981 0.984 0.986 0.990 0.994 0.997 1.000   
Day8 0.975 0.979 0.981 0.986 0.990 0.993 0.997 1.000  
Day9 0.973 0.977 0.979 0.984 0.988 0.991 0.994 0.997 1.000 
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TABLE 5. Price Ratio Correlations from the first ten trading days of the contract 
month (continued) 
Soybean Meal          
 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10 
Day1 1.000          
Day2 0.994 1.000         
Day3 0.983 0.993 1.000        
Day4 0.969 0.983 0.993 1.000       
Day5 0.956 0.972 0.984 0.994 1.000      
Day6 0.950 0.965 0.979 0.987 0.993 1.000     
Day7 0.942 0.958 0.972 0.981 0.986 0.994 1.000    
Day8 0.937 0.951 0.963 0.969 0.975 0.985 0.992 1.000   
Day9 0.944 0.954 0.963 0.966 0.971 0.976 0.981 0.989 1.000  
Day10 0.941 0.948 0.954 0.958 0.960 0.966 0.972 0.981 0.992 1.000 
Average          
 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day10 
Day1 1.000          
Day2 0.996 1.000         
Day3 0.990 0.995 1.000        
Day4 0.984 0.990 0.996 1.000       
Day5 0.978 0.984 0.990 0.996 1.000      
Day6 0.972 0.978 0.985 0.990 0.995 1.000     
Day7 0.968 0.974 0.981 0.986 0.991 0.996 1.000    
Day8 0.964 0.970 0.976 0.980 0.985 0.990 0.995 1.000   
Day9 0.963 0.968 0.973 0.976 0.981 0.985 0.990 0.995 1.000  
Day10 0.955 0.960 0.964 0.967 0.972 0.977 0.983 0.989 0.995 1.000 
 
 
Livestock Revenue Insurance / 25
TABLE 6. Premiums, dollars per head 
 Hogs  Cattle 
 
Policy 
 
Lognormal 
Inverse 
Gamma 
 
Difference 
Percentage 
Difference 
  
Lognormal 
Inverse 
Gamma 
 
Difference 
Percentage 
Difference 
85% coverage          
Net Revenue 1.98 1.89 0.09 4.55  0.11 0.10 0.01 9.09 
Monthly 2.75 2.61 0.14 5.09  1.22 1.11 0.11 9.02 
No Feed 0.68 0.60 0.08 11.76  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
90% coverage          
Net Revenue 2.90 2.81 0.09 3.10  1.17 1.05 0.12 10.26 
Monthly 3.71 3.57 0.14 3.77  3.76 3.56 0.21 5.59 
No Feed 1.57 1.49 0.08 5.10  0.71 0.62 0.08 11.27 
95% coverage          
Net Revenue 4.06 3.97 0.08 1.97  5.85 5.60 0.25 4.27 
Monthly 4.89 4.77 0.13 2.66  9.93 9.66 0.27 2.72 
No Feed 3.12 3.05 0.07 2.24  5.05 4.77 0.28 5.54 
100% coverage          
Net Revenue 5.49 5.40 0.09 1.64  18.07 17.86 0.21 1.16 
Monthly 6.32 6.20 0.11 1.74  22.65 22.43 0.22 0.97 
No Feed 5.42 5.38 0.04 0.74  18.63 18.36 0.26 1.40 
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TABLE 7. Producer welfare and premiums for revenue insurance 
 Hogs  Cattle 
Policy Premium* 
($) 
CER**  
($) 
Effi- 
ciency 
 Premium 
* ($) 
CER** 
 ($) 
Effi-
ciency 
70% coverage        
Net Revenue 713.63 83,462.15 2.04     
Monthly 1,520.45 84,695.00 1.77     
No Feed 12.60 82,040.29 2.95     
80% coverage        
Net Revenue 1,938.04 85,418.79 1.76     
Monthly 3,011.37 86,845.18 1.61     
No Feed 353.10 82,752.93 2.12     
90% coverage        
Net Revenue 4,345.37 88,731.92 1.55  84.24 46,622.26 2.26 
Monthly 5,564.50 90,164.32 1.47  270.93 46,918.83 1.80 
No Feed 2,358.85 85,884.71 1.65  50.98 46,552.79 2.37 
100% coverage        
Net Revenue 8,229.38 93,498.06 1.40  1,301.39 48,290.41 1.43 
Monthly 9,474.17 94,820.18 1.35  1,630.88 48,633.12 1.35 
No Feed 8,125.37 93,112.33 1.37  1,341.08 48,318.34 1.41 
*Premiums for the insurance products are given in Table 6 under the Lognormal heading.  
**The CER of no action is $82,003.11 for hogs and $46,431.73 for cattle. The risk premium is 
equal to 25 percent, implying risk aversion coefficients of 0.0000251 for hog producers and 
0.0001598 for cattle producers. 
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TABLE 8. Certainty equivalent returns and efficiencies 
 
Strategy 
CER less 
Premium* ($) 
 
Efficiency 
 CER less 
Premium* ($) 
 
Efficiency 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 10%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 10% 
Net Revenue 86,272.26 1.15  47,138.47 1.16 
Monthly 86,311.29 1.14  47,145.40 1.13 
No Feed 86,172.35 1.14  47,134.86 1.15 
Livestock  
  Futures 
 
86,821.99   
 
47,203.71  
Livestock  
  Options 
 
86,170.52 
 
1.13  
 
47,147.18 1.12 
All Futures 86,940.98   47,046.53  
All Options 86,239.53 1.10  47,073.57 1.05 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 25%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 25% 
Net Revenue 85,268.68 1.40  46,989.02 1.43 
Monthly 85,346.02 1.35  47,002.24 1.35 
No Feed 84,986.96 1.37  46,977.26 1.41 
Livestock  
  Futures 86,546.50   47,094.27  
Livestock 
   Options 84,973.15 1.34  46,999.57 1.30 
All Futures 86,800.46   46,661.27  
All Options 85,170.34 1.25  46,826.78 1.14 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 50%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 50% 
Net Revenue 83,755.49 1.92  46,756.08 2.02 
Monthly 83,851.63 1.81  46,769.87 1.82 
No Feed 83,003.64 1.84  46,718.73 1.96 
Livestock  
  Futures 85,928.09   46,846.43  
Livestock  
  Options 82,933.55 1.76  46,733.01 1.70 
All Futures 86,501.15   45,881.78  
All Options 83,469.09 1.58  46,400.40 1.34 
*Premiums for the insurance products are given in Table 6 under the Lognormal heading. 
The options premiums for hogs are $8,832.99 for lean hog options and $12,573.57 for 
hog and feed options. The options premiums for cattle are $1,867.94 for live cattle 
options and $2,855.90 for cattle and feed options. 
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TABLE 9. Certainty equivalent returns and efficiencies (for theoretical contracts) 
 
Strategy 
CER less 
Premium* ($) 
 
Efficiency 
 CER less 
Premium* ($) 
 
Efficiency 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 10%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 10% 
Net Revenue 86,272.26 1.15  47,138.47 1.16 
Monthly 86,311.29 1.14  47,145.40 1.13 
No Feed 86,172.35 1.14  47,134.86 1.15 
Livestock  
  Futures 86,883.49   47,238.24  
Livestock 
   Options 86,211.00 1.13  47,142.52 1.13 
All Futures 87,068.63   47,249.34  
All Options 86,297.80 1.11  47,141.70 1.11 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 25%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 25% 
Net Revenue 85,268.68 1.40  46,989.02 1.43 
Monthly 85,346.02 1.35  47,002.24 1.35 
No Feed 84,986.96 1.37  46,977.26 1.41 
Livestock  
  Futures 86,621.66   47,218.16  
Livestock  
  Options 85,065.00 1.33  46,993.10 1.34 
All Futures 87,068.63   47,248.32  
All Options 85,305.10 1.27  46,993.98 1.28 
 Hogs, Risk Premium = 50%  Cattle, Risk Premium = 50% 
Net Revenue 83,755.49 1.92  46,756.08 2.02 
Monthly 83,851.63 1.81  46,769.87 1.82 
No Feed 83,003.64 1.84  46,718.73 1.96 
Livestock 
   Futures 86,025.84   47,173.12  
Livestock  
  Options 83,106.73 1.74  46,741.19 1.79 
All Futures 87,068.63   47,246.13  
All Options 83,733.63 1.62  46,754.59 1.66 
*Premiums for the insurance products are given in Table 6 under the Lognormal heading. 
The options premiums for hogs are $9,343.31 for lean hog options and $12,053.93 for 
hog and feed options. The options premiums for cattle are $1,656.14 for live cattle 
options and $1,998.99 for cattle and feed options. 
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FIGURE 1. Distributions of hog revenues under various risk management strategies 
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FIGURE 2. Distributions of cattle revenues under various risk management strategies 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
37000 42000 47000 52000 57000 62000
Revenues
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
None
Net Revenue
No Feed
Cattle Futures
All Futures
  
 
References 
 
Alziary, B., Décamps, J., and Koehl, P. (1997). A P.D.E. approach to Asian options: 
Analytical and numerical evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 613-40. 
 
Babcock, B. A., and Hennessy, D. A. (1996). Input demand under yield and revenue 
insurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 416-27. 
 
Babcock, B. A., Choi, E. K., and Feinerman, E. (1993). Risk and probability 
premiums for CARA utility functions. Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, 18, 17-24. 
 
Glauber, J. W., Harwood, J. L., and Miranda, M. J. (1989). Federal crop insurance and 
the 1990 farm bill: An assessment of program options. Washington, D.C.: US 
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service Commodity Economics 
Division. 
 
Gray, A. W., Richardson, J. W., and McClasky, J. (1994). Farm-level impacts of 
revenue insurance. Unpublished report, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Texas A&M University. 
 
Harwood, J. L., Coble, K. H., Heifner, R. G., and Glauber, J. W. (1994). Revenue 
insurance in the U.S.: A framework, economic impacts, and implementation 
issues. Paper presented at the Risk Management Preconference, American 
Agricultural Economics Association annual meetings, San Diego, California. 
 
Hennessy, D. A., Babcock, B. A., and Hayes, D. J. (1997). Budgetary and producer 
welfare effects of revenue insurance. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 79, 1024-34. 
 
Holthausen, D. M. (1981). A risk-return model with risk and return measured as 
deviations from a target return. American Economic Review, 71, 182-88. 
 
Hull, J., and White, A. (1993). Efficient procedures for valuing European and 
American path dependent options. Journal of Derivatives, 1, 21-31. 
 
Iowa Farm Bill Study Team. (1994). Findings of the 1995 farm bill study team. 
Unpublished Report. 
 
32 / Hart, Babcock, and Hayes 
 
Lawrence, J. D. (1995). Revisions to the estimated livestock returns series. Mimeo. 
Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Extension. 
 
Levy, E. (1997). Asian options. Chapter 4 in Exotic Options: The State of the Art.    
L. Clewlow and C. Strickland (Eds.). London: International Thomson Business 
Press. 
 
_____________. (1992). Pricing European average rate currency options. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 11, 474-91. 
 
Milevsky, M. A., and Posner, S. E. (1998). Asian options, the sum of lognormals, and 
the reciprocal gamma distribution. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 33, 409-22. 
 
Palisade Corporation. (1996). Guide to Using @RISK: Risk Analysis and Simulation 
Add-In for Microsoft Excel or Lotus 1-2-3, User's Guide. 
 
Stokes, J. R., Nayda, W. I., and English, B. C. (1997). The pricing of revenue 
assurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79, 439-51. 
 
Turnbull, S. M., and Wakeman, L. M. (1991). A quick algorithm for pricing European 
average options. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26, 377-89. 
 
Turvey, C. G. (1992a). An economic analysis of alternative farm revenue insurance 
policies. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 40, 403-26. 
 
_____________. (1992b). Contingent claim pricing models implied by agricultural 
stabilization and insurance policies. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
40, 183-98. 
 
Turvey, C. G. and Amanor-Boadu, V. (1989). Evaluating premiums for a farm income 
insurance policy. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 37, 233-47. 
 
U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. (1983). Farm revenue insurance: An 
alternative risk-management option for crop farmers. CBO Staff Report, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Zvan, R., Forsyth P. A., and Vetzal, K. R. (1998). Robust numerical methods for PDE 
models of Asian options. Journal of Computational Finance, 1, 39-78.  
